By Richard T. Herman
On August 3, the United States made its Visa Bond Program permanent. Under the State Department’s final rule, otherwise qualified applicants for B-1 business and B-2 tourist visas from designated countries must place $10,000, $15,000 or $20,000 with the U.S. government before their visas can be issued.
This is not merely an American immigration story. It is predominantly an African one.
Of the 50 nationalities on the State Department’s current list of countries subject to visa bonds, 30 are African. They include Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, along with countries stretching from Algeria to Mozambique, Mauritius and Seychelles. No other region is affected on anything approaching the same scale.
The bond will touch far more than tourism. It may prevent parents from attending graduations, grandparents from meeting grandchildren, physicians from joining medical conferences, entrepreneurs from negotiating contracts and families from gathering for weddings, funerals and other milestones.
The government describes the bond as refundable. That is true.
But refundable does not mean affordable.
For some Africans, the bond is not the first barrier
The new bond requirement arrives on top of much broader restrictions on African travel.
Since January 1, the United States has partially suspended B-1 and B-2 visa issuance and entry for nationals of 14 African countries that also appear on the bond list: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Applicants subject to those restrictions may still submit applications and attend interviews, but they may be ineligible to receive visas or enter the United States unless they qualify for an exception or obtain a case-by-case national-interest determination. Visas that were valid when the restrictions took effect were not revoked under the proclamation.
For many prospective travelers from these countries, therefore, the first question is not whether they can afford a bond. It is whether a visitor visa can be issued at all.
An additional 12 African countries—including Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Libya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan—face full suspensions covering nearly all immigrant and nonimmigrant visa categories, subject to limited exceptions.
The bond program must be understood within this wider landscape. African access to the United States is being narrowed through overlapping layers of visa suspensions, financial conditions and changes in where applications can be processed.
Applicants must qualify before the bond is imposed
A bond does not make an applicant eligible for a visa. The applicant must first satisfy the ordinary legal requirements for B-1 or B-2 classification.
That is already a high bar in many affected countries. According to the State Department’s fiscal year 2025 B-visa statistics, adjusted refusal rates included 57 percent for Nigerian nationals, 53.64 percent for Ethiopians, 57.58 percent for Ugandans and 73.96 percent for Senegalese.
Applicants must persuade a consular officer that their proposed visit is temporary, that the activities are permitted, that they can finance the trip and that they have sufficiently strong reasons to return home.
Only after an officer determines that an applicant from a designated country is otherwise qualified does the bond become the next condition of issuance.
The State Department expects the ordinary bond to be $15,000. An officer may reduce it to $10,000 if the applicant cannot pay $15,000 but remains able to finance the trip. The bond may rise to $20,000 if the officer concludes that the applicant’s circumstances—including the nature and extent of contacts in the United States—require a larger financial guarantee.
The applicant’s purpose of travel, employment, income, education and skills may influence the amount.
There is no ordinary procedure through which an applicant can request a waiver. A consular officer may recommend one in limited national-interest or humanitarian circumstances, but the applicant cannot independently file a bond-waiver application.
A refundable bond can still make travel impossible
The bond is separate from the visa application fee, airfare and every other cost of the trip.
It must be paid in U.S. dollars through the government’s electronic platform. Applicants are responsible for exchange-rate losses, bank charges, wire fees and any credit- or debit-card processing costs. The money earns no interest while the government holds it.
A traveler who complies with the bond conditions should eventually recover the principal. But an applicant who must borrow the money, sell an asset, convert savings or remove capital from a business may suffer a real financial loss even when the bond is returned.
A family can recover $15,000 months later and still be worse off.
For many applicants, the larger problem is access. A middle-class professional, small-business owner or family may be financially stable without having $15,000 available for immediate transfer to the U.S. government.
The program therefore tests more than the likelihood that a traveler will depart. It also tests liquidity.
That distinction matters. A person may own a home, employ workers, support a family and have an impeccable history of international travel—and still be unable to produce a five-figure cash bond.
The pilot produced fewer overstays—and far fewer visas
The State Department originally estimated that approximately 2,000 applicants would be required to post bonds during the one-year pilot program. Instead, approximately 20,000 visa applications were determined to require bond payments.
Close to half resulted in payments, temporarily placing about $115 million of applicants’ money in government custody. Nearly half of the affected applicants chose not to pay.
The State Department also reports that B-1 and B-2 visa issuance from pilot-program countries fell by 83 percent during the program’s first 10 months compared with the same period a year earlier.
At the same time, the government reports a dramatic decline in overstays. The 50 designated countries accounted for 45,488 overstays in fiscal year 2024. During the pilot’s first 10 months, fewer than 50 bonded travelers overstayed.
The State Department presents those figures as evidence that bonds work. They certainly show that the policy changes behavior.
But they also raise a basic question: How much of the reduction occurred because bonded travelers complied, and how much occurred because dramatically fewer people received visas?
A program will naturally produce fewer overstays if it produces far fewer visitors. That does not make the government’s result meaningless. It does mean that success cannot be measured solely by counting overstays while ignoring legitimate journeys that never occurred.
The canceled family visit matters. So does the missed conference, the abandoned business negotiation, the postponed medical consultation and the tourism revenue that goes elsewhere.
Individuals are paying for weaknesses attributed to countries
The State Department says countries may be designated because of high overstay rates, inadequate information sharing, deficient identity or criminal records, weaknesses in screening and vetting, or concerns about the security of travel and civil documents.
Those criteria reach beyond the conduct of an individual traveler. They also evaluate the institutions and information systems of the traveler’s country.
A Nigerian business owner, Ethiopian grandmother or Senegalese physician may have an impeccable travel history, substantial ties to home and every intention of returning. Yet that person can still be required to place thousands of dollars with the United States because of a countrywide designation influenced partly by government-to-government information sharing or document-security concerns.
The State Department describes the program as a diplomatic tool intended to persuade foreign governments to reduce overstays and improve identity verification. But the immediate pressure is not placed on ministries or political leaders.
It is placed on individual travelers.
The burden will not fall evenly. A wealthy applicant may regard $15,000 as temporarily inaccessible capital. A middle-class applicant may regard it as an impossible condition.
Visa processing is also moving farther away
The permanent bond program is not occurring in isolation. Effective August 1, the State Department is moving routine visa services from 25 African posts to regional hubs.
Some applicants will now have to travel to another city or country for an interview, adding airfare, accommodation, ground transportation and time away from work to the cost of applying.
Those expenses must be paid without any guarantee that the applicant will receive a visa. For travelers who remain eligible and are then required to post a bond, the financial barriers accumulate.
The emerging picture is broader than a single refundable payment. For many Africans, visiting the United States is becoming more geographically difficult, financially demanding and legally uncertain.
America must count what the policy prevents
The United States has a legitimate interest in reducing overstays, maintaining secure travel documents and obtaining reliable identity information. Travelers have a corresponding obligation to comply with their status and depart when required.
African governments should cooperate in improving information sharing, document security and timely departure by their nationals. The State Department, in turn, should publish clear benchmarks explaining what each country must accomplish to leave the bond list or obtain relief from visa restrictions.
But the fact that 30 of the 50 bond-designated nationalities are African demands scrutiny. So does the fact that many African countries simultaneously face full or partial visa suspensions and the loss of local visa-processing services.
A policy with such a concentrated regional impact should be evaluated not only by how many overstays it prevents, but also by how much lawful travel it suppresses—and whether less burdensome measures could achieve the same objective.
America’s relationships with Africa are built through more than official diplomacy. They are built when entrepreneurs meet, researchers collaborate, physicians exchange knowledge, families reunite and visitors experience one another’s countries directly.
The permanent Visa Bond Program may produce fewer overstays. The State Department’s own figures strongly suggest that it will also produce fewer visitors.
Any honest assessment must count both.
About the Author
Richard T. Herman is a nationally recognized immigration attorney and founder of Herman Legal Group. He has practiced immigration law for more than 30 years and is the co-author of Immigrant, Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs Are Driving the New Economy. He writes about various law topics, including family immigration and B1/B-2 visas.